The 2022 Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Deal: From Past, Present to Future

Photo Credit: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Introduction

The maritime agreement between Israel and Lebanon, signed on October 27, 2022, represents a significant milestone in the long-standing territorial disputes between the two nations. Brokered by the United States, this agreement aimed to delineate maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly concerning the lucrative gas fields of Qana and Karish. However, the ongoing armed hostilities in 2024, particularly involving Hezbollah, pose critical questions about the agreement's sustainability and legality. Despite the ceasefire agreement in November 2024, tensions persist. This article explores the implications of current hostilities on the 2022 maritime agreement, examining its background, legal implications, and future outlook.

 

2022 Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement

The maritime border dispute between Israel and Lebanon spans decades but intensified after natural gas discoveries near Israel's coast in 2010. Negotiations for a resolution began in early 2020 under U.S. mediation, culminating in an agreement that established Line 23 as the maritime boundary. This line allowed Israel to retain control over the Karish gas field while granting Lebanon rights to explore the Qana field, with provisions for revenue sharing from any extracted resources.

 

For Lebanon, grappling with a worst economic crisis, this agreement offers a potential lifeline through energy exploration and foreign investment. The Qana field could provide much-needed resources to stabilize its economy, which has been in freefall since 2019. Conversely, for Israel, securing access to additional gas reserves is crucial for enhancing energy exports, particularly amid rising European demand due to geopolitical tensions stemming from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

 

The agreement is noteworthy not only for its economic implications but also for its political significance. Former Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid hailed the deal as a political achievement, interpreting it as Lebanon’s indirect recognition of Israel through a written agreement. Israel also anticipated that the deal could reduce threats from Hezbollah, such as sabotaging Israel's gas rigs or launching rockets at Israel, as the group stated it would respect a maritime border agreement.[1] On the other hand, the Lebanese government emphasized that this deal was purely technical and did not signify a peace agreement or recognition of statehood.[2]Nevertheless, it marked an indirect acknowledgment of Israel's existence by Lebanon which has not formally recognized Israel since its establishment in 1948.

 

2024 Lebanon-Israel Conflict

However, Rome wasn't built in a day. The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Lebanese militant group, escalated significantly in October 2023, coinciding with the outbreak of war in Gaza. Over a 14-month period, the two sides engaged in frequent cross-border skirmishes, with almost daily exchanges of fire, culminating in a full-scale invasion of southern Lebanon on October 1, 2024.

In Lebanon, more than 3,800 people have been killed since October 2023, Lebanese authorities say, with one million people were compelled to flee their homes.[3] On the Israeli side, at least 82 soldiers and 47 civilians have been killed, while 60,000 people have been displaced, according to Israeli authorities. Following intense negotiations, a ceasefire agreement was reached on November 26, 2024, and went into effect the following day.[4] Despite the ceasefire and the 60-day pause in combat, both sides accused each other of violations, highlighting the fragile nature of the agreement and the ongoing tensions between the two parties.

 

Assessment of the Validity of the Agreement Under Current Hostilities 

In evaluating the validity of the maritime agreement during the current hostilities, this analysis applies and modifies A. Graham’s framework. This framework includes five essential variables: conditions at the time of making the agreement, the nature of the agreement, the type of hostilities, its purpose, duration, the nature and extent of the changed conditions associated with the hostilities, the effect of these changed conditions on the agreement.[5]

 

1.     Conditions at the time of making the agreement

Lebanon's severe financial, political, and social crisis drove its political elite to secure economic benefits from gas exploration. This crisis was a pivotal factor in prompting Lebanon to pragmatically engage in the maritime agreement. The energy crisis caused by the Russia-Ukraine war heightened the need for agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially as Europe aimed to diversify its energy sources. This increased the appeal of Eastern Mediterranean gas resources for international stakeholders. Additionally, both countries were pressed for time—Israel had impending elections, and Lebanon's president Michel Aoun was nearing the end of his term—motivating both sides to quickly finalize the agreement.[6]

 

2.     The Nature of the Agreement

The agreement was framed as a technical resolution to a longstanding dispute, underscoring economic and security goals over broader political reconciliation, with U.S. mediation serving as the framework for indirect negotiations​.

 

3.     The Type of Hostilities, its Purpose, Duration

The 2024 hostilities involved direct military clashes between Israel and Hezbollah, including rocket attacks, airstrikes, and a ground offensive into southern Lebanon. These hostilities were part of the broader Israel-Lebanon conflict, with Hezbollah acting as a key non-state actor. Hezbollah aimed to project power, maintain its influence in Lebanon, and retaliate against Israeli actions in Gaza and ultimately to destroy Israel.[7] Meanwhile, Israel sought to neutralize Hezbollah’s military threats and ensure security along its northern border.[8] Hostilities aggravated sharply in October 2024 by Israeli ground invasion to Southern Lebanon and persisted for weeks.

 

4.     The Nature and Extent of the Changed Conditions Associated with the Hostilities

Since the expiration of President Michel Aoun’s term in October 2022, Lebanon has been governed by a caretaker government in the absence of a president. This political vacuum has accelerated the growing influence of Hezbollah within the country, as well as hindering the parliament's attempts to elect a president.[9] The hostilities in 2024 have further exacerbated the situation, leading to a drastic escalation of violence that surpasses previous conflicts in both intensity and scope. The relative calm that existed throughout the negotiation and signing of the 2022 maritime agreement has completely broken down.

Adding to the instability, Israel’s political stance has shifted, with calls emerging to dissolve the 2022 maritime agreement.[10]For Lebanon, the ongoing conflict has jeopardized its ability to fully exploit its newly acquired gas fields, creating additional economic and operational challenges. International actors involved in the agreement, notably TotalEnergies and the U.S., have encountered difficulties in ensuring compliance and maintaining operations amidst the escalating hostilities. The maritime border deal requires Lebanon's Block 9 Operator, to coordinate with Israel on matters such as prior notification and royalty sharing. However, this coordination has become increasingly impractical.[11] By late 2024, the U.S., as the agreement’s mediator and recipient of cross-boundary resources data, has been compelled to shift its focus from monitoring implementation to brokering a ceasefire between the warring parties.[12]

 

5.     The Effect of These Changed Conditions on the Agreement

Israel's Energy Minister called for the dissolution of the deal on September 29, 2024, labeling it a "mistake" and Israel is considering assuming control over the formerly disputed gas fields, potentially nullifying Lebanon's gains from the agreement. Since Total Energies, a French energy consortium, holds a licensing agreement with Lebanon for drilling in Lebanon’s gas fields gained in the deal, some speculate that Israeli officials are willing to jeopardize the deal as a means of retaliation towards France, in the wake of Macron’s support for increased aid to Lebanon and calls for a ceasefire. [13]

In Lebanon, TotalEnergies and its consortium partners Eni and Qatar Energy announced they completed the first well drilling in Block 9, where the Qana field is located. However, TotalEnergies has not yet submitted its drilling report to Lebanon's Petroleum Administration, despite repeated requests. The Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water suggested that the delay could be due to ongoing political and military tensions in the region, particularly the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. This delay might also be seen as part of broader pressure tactics related to the conflict.[14] These developments underscore the fragile nature of the agreement, with political and military tensions threatening its implementation and raising doubts about its long-term viability.

 

Automatic Operation of Law

Not only do the hostilities threaten the stability of the agreement, but one party aspiring to break the deal while the other is under volatile leadership raises questions about its validity. In such circumstances, the doctrine of "Automatic Operation of Law" is particularly relevant. This principle holds that the outbreak of hostilities does not automatically terminate all pre-existing treaties between the parties involved.[15] The nature of the treaty itself is crucial in determining its fate during times of conflict. If a treaty is made expressly applicable to a state of war, it must remain in force, for the very purpose of its creation has arisen.[16]

The reason for its continuity lies in its technical and physical nature rather than being a purely political agreement. Additionally, the agreement’s intrinsic connection to resource-sharing and economic exploitation establishes it as an operational framework rather than a symbolic gesture. The agreement likely serves mutual interests that transcend political differences. Even in times of hostility, both parties may benefit from maintaining certain technical or infrastructural arrangements, making unilateral termination impractical or undesirable. Likewise, Israel has continued its natural gas production during periods of conflict, thereby maintaining its energy revenues. Especially, the gas from the Karish field prevented potential shortages when the Tamar field ceased production for several weeks at the start of the Gaza war in October 2023.[17] This distinction makes it resilient to political fluctuations or leadership changes, as its execution relies on tangible objectives like energy exploration, which are difficult to nullify without severe regional repercussions.

 

Conclusion

With ongoing armed hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, concerns about the durability and efficacy of the 2022 maritime agreement are increasing. Some Israeli officials advocate for its termination due to security issues, but international law maintains that such agreements stay valid unless they are officially annulled or fundamentally changed by mutual consent. The economic prospects for both countries are substantial, yet achieving this potential depends on Lebanon's political stability and ongoing compliance with the terms of the maritime agreement.

By Min Hong

*** The views expressed herein belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Journal of Maritime and Territorial Studies or Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. ***

[1] Toi Staff, “Israel and Lebanon approve maritime deal; Lapid hails ‘recognition’ by enemy state,” The Times of Israel, October 27, 2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-approves-lebanon-deal-lapid-hails-recognition-by-enemy-state/, accessed December 11, 2024.

[2] “Israel, Lebanon Sign US-Brokered Maritime Border Deal,” Al Jazeera, October 27, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/27/israel-lebanon-sign-us-brokered-maritime-border-deal, accessed December 11, 2024.

[3] “Israel-Hezbollah conflict in maps: Ceasefire in effect in Lebanon,” BBC News, November 28, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9vp7dg3ml1o, accessed December 17, 2024.

[4] Ibid.

[5] A. Graham, “The Effects of Domestic Hostilities on Public and Private International Agreements: A Tentative Approach.”, Western Law Review 3 (1964), p. 129-130.

[6] Ahmet Sözen, Nimrod Goren, and Camille Limon, eds., “Conflict Resolution in the Mediterranean: Energy as a Potential Game-Changer,” Diplomeds - The Council for Mediterranean Diplomacy and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2023), p. 23-36.

[7] Huzeir Ezekiel Dzulhisham, “An Israel-Hezbollah war: the winners and the losers,” RSIS Commentaries 094-24 (2024), p.3, https://hdl.handle.net/10356/179635; and Al Jazeera Staff, “Israel kills 11 people in Lebanon; Hezbollah attacks Israeli site,” Al Jazeera, December 2, 2024 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/2/israeli-attacks-kill-two-people-in-lebanon-hezbollah-responds, accessed January 31, 2025.

[8] Nader Durgham and Josephine Deeb, “Israel's invasion of Lebanon: What is happening on the ground?,” Middle East Eye, October 17, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israels-invasion-lebanon-what-happening-ground , accessed January 31, 2025; and David Brennan, “What are Israel's goals in its south Lebanon incursion?,” ABC News, October 3, 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/International/israels-goals-south-lebanon-incursion/story?id=114376302, accessed January 31, 2025.

[9] Clayton Thomas and Jim Zanotti, “Lebanese Hezbollah,” CRS Report No. IF10703, December 4, 2024,https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10703. 

[10] Daniel Markind, “Israel Considers Cancelling Lebanon Gas Deal,” Forbes, October 2, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielmarkind/2024/10/02/israel-considers-cancelling-lebanon-gas-deal/, accessed December 29, 2024

[11] Maritime Border Deal Agreed between Israel and Lebanon, UN Peacemaker, October 12, 2022, pp.2, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/maritime20border20deal20agreed20between20israel20and20lebanon.pdf, accessed February 4, 2025.

[12] Amatzia Baram, “A plan to end the Israel-Hezbollah war”, GIS Reports, November 26, 2024, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/israel-hezbollah-proposal/, accessed February 1, 2025.

[13] Gabrielle Moran, “Israel Pulls an Economic Lever on Lebanon,” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, October 2024, https://jstribune.com/moran-israel-pulls-an-economic-lever-on-lebanon/, accessed January 3, 2025.

[14] “Lebanon Presses TotalEnergies for Report on Oil Exploration,” Kataeb, April 20, 2024, https://en.kataeb.org/articles/lebanon-presses-totalenergies-for-report-on-oil-exploration/, accessed January 3, 2025.

[15] A. Graham, “The Effects of Domestic Hostilities on Public and Private International Agreements: A Tentative Approach.”, Western Law Review 3 (1964), p. 138-139.

[16] Graham, 1964, p.138-139.

[17]  Simon Henderson, “Israeli Gas Field near Lebanon Starts Production,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 4, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israeli-gas-field-near-lebanon-starts-production/, accessed January 6, 2025.