Beyond Non-Alignment: India’s Assertive Turn in a Multipolar World

From a post-colonial ethic of non-alignment, India has pivoted through pragmatic multi-alignment to a self-defined “core alignment,” recalibrating every partnership by a single metric: does it harden India’s security, economic, or technological autonomy against China’s rise and shifting great-power fault lines? The shift—evident in the 2025 cross-border reprisal against Pakistan and in India’s simultaneous oil buys from Russia and data-sharing pacts with the Quad—signals that New Delhi will now trade ideological ambiguity for interest-driven clarity, accepting friction with old friends (and new) whenever national priorities demand it.

Non-alignment Phase (Post-independence to 1960s)

India’s foreign policy is rooted in India's civilizational values and anti-colonial experiences, of non-violence, tolerance, cooperation, peaceful co-existence, equality, self-determination, racial equality, and decolonization. These values defined its postcolonial stance and pushed India to cofound the Non-Aligned Movement along with other newly decolonised countries. Non-alignment served as a foreign policy tool pursued by the decolonized countries to advance their national interests without entangling themselves in any military alliances and safeguarding their sovereignty. 

This helped India to constructively engage with both blocs, whereby India collaborated with the US on decolonisation efforts and accepted development aid, while simultaneously engaging with the USSR for technology, infrastructure assistance, and support for the Kashmir issue.  However, India refused to join any military pacts with both blocs. It voiced independent opinion on decolonisation, containment, communism, democracy, etc, and also condemned actions by the West and the USSR in Suez and Hungary respectively. 

Thus, in this phase, India refused to be a client state through this deliberate policy choice. This opened opportunities for India and advanced India's development.

Crumbling of non-alignment and the rise of multi-alignment

The 1962 Indo-China War exposed the limits of non-alignment. It alone cannot safeguard India's security in dealing with geopolitical security threats, particularly complex territorial disputes. India's appeal to the US for assistance against Chinese aggression in 1962 and signing the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Peace with Russia amid the US-China-Pakistan trilateralism in 1971 hinted at contradictions to the NAM idea of equidistance. This revealed India's intentions for flexible security partnerships and strategic alignment.

Moreover, as India retained its trade, technology, and education relationships with the West despite the Soviet tilt, and conducted nuclear tests, despite the West's dislike, it marked its strategic defiance rather than bloc alignment.

Simultaneously, India appealed for developmental justice in the Third World by engaging on platforms like the New International Economic Order, UN Trade and Development, and Group-77. This ability to maintain active engagements with both blocs and third world countries simultaneously marked India's gradual shift from non-alignment to multialignment, rooted in balancing developmental advocacy with security pragmatism through strategic and flexible partnerships.

Developmental Pragmatism to Strategic Multi-Alignment (1991 to 2010s)

Post Cold-War, India's focus shifted from ideological purity to developmental pragmatism. The balance-of-payments crisis in 1991 forced India to open its economy.  Economic pragmatism fostered closer relationships with the USA, EU, and ASEAN. It also engaged in Indo-Pacific cooperation and signed the US-India Civil Nuclear Deal. It redefined its friendship with the Middle East beyond Cold War politics, forming strategic ties. It normalised diplomatic ties with Israel in 1991, signed defence agreements with Gulf countries, deepened relations with Iran, etc.

It preserved its partnership with Russia as they cooperated on space, defence, and energy issues. In the 2000s, India gained membership in diversified platforms, becoming a member of multiple forums with conflicting blocs: G20 (with the West), BRICS (with Russia and China), SCO (observer then), NAM, and ASEAN dialogues. These also became platforms to enhance its relations with the developing world. It also helped establish BIMSTEC (2004) and BRICS (2009). This ability to maintain parallel relations with rival countries like the US and Iran, the US and Russia, etc., served as a hallmark of India's multi-alignment.

This ability to maintain parallel yet conflicting relationships like purchasing arms from Russia, cooperating with the US on Indo-Pacific, etc, marked India's maturing multi-alignment. This helped India navigate vulnerabilities like energy dependence, technological gaps, and limited bargaining power in multilateral institutions. Thus, multi-alignment helped India to enhance its global integration and expand its strategic reach without compromising its sovereignty and preserving its strategic autonomy. 

Towards a Core-alignment (2014 onwards)

The rise of China, deteriorating US-China and Indo-China relations, and mounting regional volatilities have necessitated India to clarify its strategic position.  Moreover, strategic ambiguity limits global confidence in its leadership, undermining its UNSC aspirations. Thus, strategic clarity has become essential for India to achieve its interests.   As a result, India is pursuing selective, high-value partnerships based on its strategic interests, aiming to navigate the geopolitical challenges and advance its national interest. 

India has renewed its interests in the Indian Ocean. Its interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific and Blue economy has facilitated partnerships with QUAD countries and with ASEAN respectively. Additionally, India has designed the SAGAR initiative and received port access in Sabang, Changi, and Duqm. This reveals its shift from moral posturing to strategic maritime presence. Moreover, India has strengthened defence ties with France, purchased Rafale Jets; the US through BECA, COMCASA, and LEMOA; Israel for cybersecurity and critical infrastructure; building defence attaches and naval bases in Africa, etc. This reveals India's assertion for technological self-sufficiency and joint force projection. India has further diversified its energy relations with Russia despite Western rebuke, partnering with Gulf countries including Iran and exploring African hydrocarbons and Central Asian uranium supplies. This reflects an autonomy-first approach revealing itself as a pragmatic, interest-oriented player in the energy market. Additionally, India has enhanced its climate diplomacy ties with the EU, renewable energy diplomacy with the Global South through the International Solar Alliance, biofuel cooperation, etc. 

Additionally, india asserts its autonomy by purchasing Russian oil which the Indian Foreign Minister defendinn india's purchase as "best deal in the interest of the people"; abrogated Article 370 asserting its sovereign right despite international rebukes; withdrew from Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership asserting its economic sovereignty; proactive humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan despite under a Talban Regime etc. Additionally, India has engaged in alternative partnerships like its Neighbourhood First policy, IORA, BIMSTEC, Kaladan Project, etc, to shape the region.  It has severed most of its economic ties despite knowing the possible repercussions in pursuing its national interests. This reveals India's clear intentions to shape the order rather than become shaped by it, focusing on pursuing its national interests. 

Policy Recommendations: Addressing Strategic Gaps:

India's core-alignment attempts to uphold India's strategic autonomy by avoiding formal bloc loyalty. However, this is not without contradictions and challenges. For instance, India's core alignment is undermined by over-reliance on specific partners such as the US for security and Russia for energy, which may risk positioning India as anti-China and face potential sanctions. Moreover, its simultaneous deepening relations in QUAD and BRICS have competing expectations. Balancing the competing partners is a big challenge as it will require India to manage the US-China-Russia prism tactfully. India lacks codified red lines on terrorism, border incursions, etc, which creates uncertainty among partners. Moreover, India's deteriorating relations with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, etc, due to citizenship laws, water-sharing disputes, etc., and its unilaterally suspending the Indus Water Treaty in 2025 undermine its credibility and goodwill despite exercising its autonomy. India also risks its Global South leadership credibility as its actions reflect a closer partnership with Western powers, drifting from Global South solidarity toward great power politics. 

India should implement targeted reforms emphasizing clarity, coherence, and assertiveness to address the identified gaps.

• Codify and Communicate Doctrines: India should publish a white paper outlining "red lines" and response protocols on key issues like terrorism, border encroachments, etc., to reduce situational ambiguity. A dedicated Foreign Policy Council should be established under the Prime Minister's Office to integrate defense, economic, and diplomatic inputs and ensure consistent communication.

• Strengthen Regional Engagement: The Neighborhood First policy should be revitalised, focusing on bilateral dialogues to mend ties with Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, addressing grievances over water-sharing and citizenship laws, etc. Regional institutions like the SAARC should be revived with conflict-resolution mechanisms to counter China's influence without alienating smaller states.

• Enhance Strategic Autonomy with Safeguards: To resolve multi-alignment contradictions, diversifying defense procurement, boosting indigenous production, and negotiating CAATSA exemptions through deeper US ties is required. Additionally, forming issue-specific multilaterals like with ASEAN on South China Sea, the QUAD on Indo-Pacific, etc., for reliable partnerships, and holding regular Global South summits to build trust-based alliances is necessary.

• Address Global South Leadership Gaps:  India should lead global terror frameworks and peace negotiations, take a clear stance on human rights, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and champion the cause of the Global South through concrete aid (e.g., debt relief for African nations) to avoid shallow relationships and build a credible stance. It should invest in emerging tech with QUAD-like for AI/cyber capabilities and supply-chain resilience, etc.

• Internal Structural Changes: It should involve states in foreign policymaking, particularly the border states like Northeast, with ASEAN. Enhancing diplomats' training in multi-domain warfare and economic statecraft, and increasing budget allocations for defense R&D by 3% of GDP, is required. 

These reforms would make India's approach more coherent, transforming selective alignment into a robust, proactive strategy. This encapsulates the transformation in its foreign policy strategy from reactive realism to strategic necessity and global ambition. Thus, core-alignment through strategic convergence, selective depth, and assertive posturing has helped India to enter into a leadership-based multipolar world, avoiding a cautious Cold War template. The time for global sympathies is gone. India's credibility now relies on how clearly it articulates, responds confidently, and aligns strategically to claim its rightful place in the world order and advance its national interests.

*** The views expressed herein belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Journal of Maritime and Territorial Studies or Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. ***